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The first sovereign wealth fund (SWF) was established by Kuwait in 1953,1 and was followed by 
many others from 1973-4, after the first oil crisis.2 Since then, each major jump in oil and gas 
prices increased the number and size of SWFs; after 2000, countries with large trade surpluses 
also began to establish SWFs. By April 2009, SWFs had grown to $3-5 trillion of assets under 
management,3 invested mostly in high quality bonds. Equity investments have been a much 
smaller part of their portfolio and began to grow only in the 1990s. This trend has since 
accelerated with at least 698 documented equity investments between June 2005 and March 
2009.4 
 
These investments brought SWFs not only increased attention, but also their name, adopted by 
the Financial Times in May 2007.5 This has been unfortunate and misleading. The term has 
endowed SWFs with a special and even threatening aura, even though, under international law, 
they do not enjoy sovereign immunity, as they are just state-owned entities, along with 
government-owned airlines, banks, shipping companies, etc. We have a long history of national 
and international jurisprudence for dealing with these, but, since reality is rarely a bar to fashion, 
the term is here to stay. 
                                                 
*
 Charles Kovacs, writing in a personal capacity, is a former international and investment banker. He is now 
Chairperson, Hid Radio Zrt in Budapest, Hungary. He can be contacted at charles.kovacs@hidradiort.hu. The views 
expressed by the individual author in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Columbia 
University or its partners and supporters. The author wishes to thank Rudi Bogni, Mary Bonar, Veljko Fotak, 
Nanette Neuwahl, and Stephen Y. K. Pan for their helpful comments on this Perspective. Columbia FDI 
Perspectives is a peer-reviewed series. 
1
 Bernardo Bortoletti, Veljko Fotak, William L. Meggison, William F. Miracky, “Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investment Patterns and Performance,” MSS Draft, 13 July 2009, p.39, 49. (Hereafter: BFMM). 
2
 Singapore, was the exception to this rule; it established in Temasek Holdings in 1974, and the Government of 
Singapore Investment Corporation in 1981. 
3
 BFMM, p. 37, listing 32 funds that meet Monitor-FEEM standards, with $1,831 mn in assets, while UNCTAD’s 
World Investment Report (United Nations: New York and Geneva, 2008), p. 20 reported $5 bn as a headline 
number, but also noted $3 bn+ as a credible estimate. 
4
 BRFMM, p. 1. 
5
 Ibid, p. 50. 
 The recent large investments by SWFs in troubled financial institutions brought these funds 
unprecedented publicity, and the increased attention of the governments of host countries and of 
IFIs. The former were interested mainly in the economic and security implications of SWFs’ 
investments, while the latter, and the OECD in particular, seem concerned that SWFs might face 
restrictions by host countries of the kind that many of the SWFs’ home countries have been 
applying against foreign investors.6 
 
How important in fact are the SWFs? Of course, 3-5 trillion dollars is a lot of money, but it is 
only a small part of the investment universe. This universe includes external sovereign debt of 
$55 trillion, equities of at least $40 trillion, plus even more in real estate, artificial financial 
instruments, precious metals, commodity trading instruments, and so on and on.  SWFs are 
actually one of the smaller players, just above hedge funds. By way of comparison, pension 
funds, mutual funds and insurance funds each have approximately US$20-23 trillion of assets.  
 
Paradoxically, SWFs are least important with regards to foreign direct investment (FDI), defined 
by the IMF as equity investments that exceed 10% of the target company’s voting shares. Annual 
FDI flows in the past 10 years have ranged between US$600 billion to a record US$2 trillion in 
2007. Meanwhile, the FDI from SWFs amounted to only US$10 billion in 2007: 0.2% of their 
total assets, and 0.6% of the FDI flows that year.7 
 
Clearly, the attention and concern generated by SWFs has been disproportionate to their systemic 
importance, and especially so regarding FDI. The reasons? SWFs are good copy for the media 
because most are from distant countries with dictatorial or authoritarian regimes, they are at least 
vaguely mysterious, and many of their transactions are genuinely newsworthy. The media’s 
focus has in turn generated hype and political attention, and much of what we are witnessing 
now is similar to the spectacles of the late 1970s about Arab equity investments in the United 
States and Western Europe. 
 
The attention by governments has been partly a response to public and political pressures, but 
their concern about national security should not be underestimated. All foreign investment has 
been subject to national security considerations for a long time. SWFs are instruments of state, 
mostly of states with at best delicate relations with NATO member countries, and several belong 
to potential adversaries with a long history of extensive and effective espionage. SWFs are not 
the best vehicle for information gathering, influencing host countries, and for various economic 
and commercial mischief, and this is why national security related reviews cover all foreign 
investments. 
 
In the coming years, SWFs will grow in number and size, probably in an international arena 
more turbulent than now, and SWFs will continue to favor the major advanced economies. 
Although SWFs are unlikely to become a significant source of FDI, their importance in other 
equity investments may well increase along the lines of their recent acquisitions of up to 9.99% 
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of several major financial institutions. Consequently, host governments will continue to be 
obliged to follow a fine line between the demands of national security, balanced against the 
desirability of increased capital inflows, and the goodwill of countries needed for the attainment 
of foreign policy objectives. 
 
This may well require a review process for SWFs that goes beyond the existing review 
mechanisms, and may even have informal aspects.  Host countries will need to differentiate 
SWFs by their nationality and by their relationship with the host countries. Therefore, decision-
making will need the direct involvement of the diplomatic, military and intelligence communities 
while still acting within the time frame required by investors. All this may seem daunting, but the 
United States and the United Kingdom in particular have immense experience in dealing with 
foreign investment since the First World War. These experiences and modus operandi are readily 
transferable to existing or new monitoring entities. It remains to be seen whether SWFs will 
become a source of conflict or of responsible capital, but judging from past experience, a 
sensible and sensitive review process should serve well both the SWFs and the host countries as 
long as they are both aiming at a seamless and quiet settlement of actual and potential 
disagreements. After all, business is business, and host countries and SWFs have already 
established an agreeable symbiotic relationship. 
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